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Regulatory Multiplicity and Conflict: Towards a Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance in Nigeria1 
Abstract 
Given the multiplicity of codes designed to regulate different stakeholders in terms of 
promoting good corporate governance, this paper examines areas of conflicts amongst the 
various codes and the associated implications for corporate governance practices and 
regulatory compliances by public listed Nigerian firms. Using the conflict-signalling theory 
for developing the conceptual framework, this study examines the proliferation of codes in 
Nigeria, through a mixed method approach to provide an exploratory account of the 
implications of corporate governance regulatory multiplicity. Evidence suggests the presence 
of conflict among the various codes which contributes to reduced compliance by firms and 
ineffective enforceability by regulatory agencies, which both impede good corporate 
governance in Nigeria. The findings advance conflict-signalling theory as an important 
framework for understanding the implications of the conflicts arising from the multiplicity of 
codes.  
 
Paper Type: Research paper. 
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Introduction 
This paper addresses the nature, challenges and implications arising from the multiplicity of 
codes and its attendant regulatory conflicts on the effectiveness of corporate governance 
                                                          
1 This research study received funding from the British Academy, for which the authors are grateful. 
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practices. We define corporate governance regulatory multiplicity as the presence of different 
codes of conduct which are there to regulate different and intertwined stakeholders in the 
corporate sector. By intertwined stakeholders, we mean those companies who are subject to 
multiple regulatory provisions (Ofo, 2013).   
 
The 2007-2009 global economic crises have reiterated the importance of good corporate 
governance practices in both developed and developing economies. As a result, there have 
been increased calls for corporate governance reforms. These reforms are hinged on both the 
environmental, historical and global economic contexts of different countries’ regulations and 
how corporate governance regulations are designed to suit their purposes and peculiarities 
(Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2008). For example, corporate governance codes at country levels 
are important aspect of such regulations aimed at creating a set of best practices for 
companies, by providing recommendations regarding the behaviour and structure of the board 
of directors of firms (Aguilera et. al., 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et. al., 1997; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).  
 
Several authors have attempted to define corporate governance regulatory codes.  Chizema, 
(2008: 360) defined corporate governance codes as a voluntary set of principles, 
recommendations, standards, or best practices, issued by a collective body, and relating to the 
internal governance of corporations within a country. Similarly, Weil et al. (2003) referred to 
it as ‘a non-binding set of principles, standards, or best practices, issued by a collective body 
relating to the internal governance of corporations’. On the other hand, Ofo (2010) defined 
regulatory codes as a structure or body responsible for unifying the interests of all the 
stakeholders of a corporate entity, including shareholders, management, customers and 
society at large. However, in the literature on corporate governance codes, scholars have 
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focused mainly on national governance codes/standards and the similarities and differences 
between countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 2009; Aguilera et al., 2006).  
In particular, the notion of corporate governance reforms in developing countries reflects 
their historical ties with their colonial past (Ahunwan, 2002; Nam and Nam, 2004; Lu et al. 
2009; Senaratne and Gunaratne, 2008). The institutional arrangements of developing 
economies (that is, culture, social norms, laws, the court, political system and regulatory 
framework) are essential to the corporate governance regulation and style of corporate 
governance practices by firms. Accordingly, the need for countries to fashion out their 
corporate governance codes in line with their values, culture and environments led to 
different nations formulating their own codes. Therefore, countries select and design the type 
of corporate governance regulation and system that is suitable for their country and firms 
(Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011; Okike and Adegbite; 2012).  Thus, the extant literature on 
comparative corporate governance continues to highlight the impacts of regulatory 
multiplicity in transnational systems of corporate governance (Demaki, 2011; Aguilera et. al., 
2008; Ofo, 2010; Alonso-Pauli and Perez-Castrillo; 2012). However, the literature has paid 
almost no attention to the occurrence and implications of corporate governance regulatory 
multiplicity at individual country levels. This is particularly vital to understanding the 
regulatory challenges of corporate governance in developing economies. 
 
In this paper, we examine the conflicts arising from different codes of corporate governance 
(available to regulate different industries) operating internally within a country. This paper 
examines the case of Nigeria, given the multiplicity of codes designed to regulate different 
stakeholders in terms of promoting good corporate governance. In particular, it examines 
areas of conflicts amongst the various codes and the associated implications for regulatory 
compliance by public listed Nigerian firms (Adegbite, 2013). Contextualising the study in 
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Nigeria is useful, not only because of the many different codes of conduct2, but also to see 
how these function within the weak institutional climate of corruption to inform corporate 
governance behaviour. 
Theoretically, this focus helps the paper to address the issue of regulatory conflict due to 
multiplicity, which has been understudied in the literature. In particular, we introduce the 
conflict-signalling theory into the discourse on corporate governance regulatory multiplicity. 
This helps to provide an understanding of the differences and similarities in the content of 
corporate governance codes designed to regulate the different sectors of the Nigerian 
economy. From a practice perspective, this helps us to underscore the determinants or key 
factors affecting the levels of compliance with corporate governance codes. Empirically, this 
study offers perspectives from a less discussed research site and adds to the limited works on 
corporate governance regulation in developing countries. 
 
In order to explore and understand the implications of the conflict arising from the 
multiplicity of codes, this paper is guided by the question: what are the nature, challenges and 
implications arising from regulatory conflicts on the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices? The rest of this paper is organised as follows. First, we present the theoretical 
framework of our study, followed by, a discussion on the literature on corporate governance 
regulation, with emphasis on the lacuna in studies on the multiplicity of corporate governance 
codes. This helps to articulate our research focus within the Nigerian context. Third, we 
                                                          
2There is multiplicity of corporate governance codes in Nigeria. These are the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Code of Corporate Governance developed in 2003 later revised in 2011 (the SEC Code), the 
2006 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation (CBN Code), the 2007 SEC Code 
of Conduct for Shareholders’ Associations (SEC Code for Shareholders), the 2008 Pension Commission of 
Nigeria’s Code of Corporate Governance for Licensed Pension Operators (PENCOM Code), and the 2009 
National Insurance Commission’s Code of Good Corporate Governance for the Insurance industry (NAICOM 
Code). Banks are examples of intertwined stakeholders as they have to comply with the SEC and CBN Codes. 
The SEC Code which applies to all companies is voluntary, while the 3 industry specific codes (CBN, 
NAICOM and PENCOM) are mandatory. 
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outline our research methodology and thereafter present and discuss our findings in the light 
of their contributions to theory and practice. Lastly, we present our conclusions. 
Regulatory Multiplicity in Corporate Governance Codes: Literature Review and 
Development of Theoretical Framework  
The corporate governance regulation debate is centred on two premises. At one end of the 
debate, the central argument is the preference and need to encourage more soft-law 
alternatives, in the form of ‘codes of conduct’, which allows firms to voluntarily adhere to 
good corporate governance practices whilst at the other end of the debate, there is the 
perception that there is need to increase regulation and punish corporate offenders more 
heavily through hard law (Adegbite, 2012). However, the paradigm of corporate governance 
regulation continues to witness the emergence of new codes of conduct for corporate 
governance or the revisions to existing ones (La Porta et al., 2002; Berger et al., 2005; 
Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). The proliferation of codes across countries is thus evident 
(Cuervo, 2002; Aguilera et. al., 2008) and the multiplicity of codes within countries is 
increasing (Ofo, 2010).  
 
Moghalu (2011) argued that multiplicity of codes in a single country helps to satisfy different 
stakeholders, especially firms in different industries who may have different stakeholders that 
have peculiar needs/expectations that cannot be accommodated with a single ‘one size fits 
all’ code of corporate governance (Engle, 2007). Despite the case for multiple regulatory 
codes, it is still controversial in many ways. For instance, Kirkbride and Letza (2004) argue 
that while multiple self-regulatory codes bring confidence to the market, regulators, and 
investors as well as flexibility to the companies (see Hoffmann, 1998), they create an 
atmosphere of uncertainty, and lack of precision among companies and practitioners. Also, 
incoherence and conflict within codes may lead to weakness in enforcement and inability to 
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separate compliant firms from non-compliant ones. For example, Brooks (1989) pointed out 
the significance of multiplicity of codes in Canada, and the potential attendant conflicts in 
them. The interpretation of various codes is a challenge to the companies (Brooks, 1989) and 
there is usually an overlap as well as gaps in coordination among the multiple regulators and 
codes of corporate governance themselves, particularly in developing countries (e.g. India, 
Bangladesh, and Nigeria) where multiple codes are apparent (Kaushik and Kamboj, 2010). 
Multiple codes of corporate governance are therefore capable of causing conflicts, confusion 
and inter-regulatory problems (Peterson, 2002; Ahunwan, 2002; Rodriguez-Dominguez, et 
al., 2009; Siddiqui, 2010; Rossouw, et al. 2002; Malherbe and Segal, 2007), hence our focus 
on the conflicts arising from the multiplicity of codes within a single country and its 
implication on firms’ compliance and governance practices. 
 
Our focus on the implications of corporate governance regulatory multiplicity, however, 
requires a unique theoretical anchoring. In the extant literature on corporate governance, 
scholars mainly rely on the theories of agency, stewardship, resource-dependence, legitimacy 
and stakeholder to explain the effects of corporate governance on managerial and company’s 
decisions with regards to compliance to regulation, including codes of conduct and ethics 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Freeman, 1984; Carroll, 1991; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; La 
Porta et a. 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Filatotchev et al. 2001; Kirkbride and Letza, 
2004). However, a complex phenomenon such as the multiplicity of codes cannot be 
explained by a single theory (Monks and Minows, 2004) or entirely with any of these 
mainstream theories of corporate governance, as these theories have to be viewed as 
complement to each other rather than competitive (Fadare, 2011). Hence, in this study, we 
have employed an eclectic approach (Kirkbride and Letza, 2004) and a multi-theoretical 
framework (Kirkbride and Letza, 2004) in order to explain the nature and extent of the 
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conflicts arising from the codes. In particular, we use the conflict-signalling theoretical 
perspective to explain the effects of conflicts on practitioners and their practices within an 
organisational context in an emerging economy. The conflict-signalling theory is a 
combination of two theories - the conflict theory and the signalling theory. We start with the 
former.   
 
Based on Karl Marx’s original thinking in the mid-1800s, the conflict theory assumes that 
human behaviour in social contexts results from conflicts between competing groups (Letza 
et al., 2008). In this case, Marx focused on social conflict. Subsequently, the conflict theory 
has evolved to focus on a common theme that different social groups have unequal and 
uneven power, even though all groups struggle for the same limited resources (Schmitt et al., 
2006). Conflict theory thus concerns itself with the common good of not only the society but 
that of corporations (Kabbah de Castro, 2009), particularly when there are stakeholder 
disagreements within a corporate governance system (Ford and Hess, 2011).  
 
Thus, in examining corporate governance regulatory multiplicity, conflict theory helps us to 
understand why there is conflict and the rationale behind a board’s decision on which code to 
comply with, even when there are inherent disagreements among the codes. Hence, the 
conflict theory assumes that the behaviour of top managers and their decision making are 
influenced by the conflicts within competing codes which leaves managers with the 
opportunistic tendency to comply with a less stringent code or outright non-compliance. This 
conflict and its attendant compliance implications for listed companies send mixed signals 
(i.e. signalling theory) to investors and the regulatory authorities, as well as cause tension 
among stakeholders and encourage bad corporate governance practices. 
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Signalling theory is centred on communication between individuals, companies and 
regulatory agencies (Kabbach de Castro, 2009). Sometimes humans with conflicting interests 
are expected to communicate honestly (i.e. no presumption being made of conscious 
intention) rather than cheat (Rotchschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Kabbach de Castro, 2009). This 
assumption has implications for corporate reporting and disclosures, where managers who 
have access to more information than other stakeholders, may disclose or withhold 
information for personal benefits such as their job security.  
 
For example, due to information asymmetry, signalling theory suggests that corporations with 
superior information transparency signal better corporate governance and better performance 
(Rotchschild and Stiglitz, 1976). Thus, companies that comply with the codes signal good 
corporate governance, particularly through good reporting. Signalling can therefore act as a 
screening device which is implemented by the uninformed party (shareholders) using self-
selection mechanisms to sort companies for investment (see Rotchschild and Stiglitz, 1976). 
The literature on voluntary disclosure (Hughes, 1986) recognises that the signalling theory 
plays a vital role as a motivation3 for companies to disclose their practices. However, as for 
the multiplicity of codes, the company that does not comply may justify non-compliance by 
citing conflicts as the rationale behind their decisions, providing the uninformed stakeholders 
with no useful information about the true state of governance in the company. 
 
                                                          
3This incentive to provide information acts a boost to the market which leads to economic benefits. Also, 
signalling can be used by managers as an incentive to distinguish themselves from others using information 
disclosures as a tool. Therefore, compliance to codes may have economic benefits to the firm, based on the level 
of disclosure through reporting instruments such as the annual report and financial statements. Seeking to 
understand companies’ attitudes towards compliance with codes, we focus on signalling as a complimentary tool 
with conflict theory (that is conflict-signal) to explain these behaviours of non-compliance from managers and 
the lack of enforceability from regulators as problems arising from multiplicity of codes. 
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Therefore, both conflict and signalling theories complement each other and also help to 
explain the multiplicity of codes in the corporate governance system. In particular, they help 
us to examine how this affects the development of good corporate governance in Nigeria. It 
also enables us to highlight how regulatory cohesiveness moderates the behaviours and 
decision-making of managers and companies in terms of compliance. Next, we provide a 
description of the Nigerian corporate governance regulatory terrain. 
 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Nigeria: The History of Multiplicity 
After Nigeria’s independence from Britain in 1960, the first elaborate regulatory framework 
is the Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990 which provides the legal 
framework for corporate governance in Nigeria. CAMA 1990 replaced the Company’s Act of 
1968 as a result of changes in the social, political and economic environments in Nigeria’s 
post-independence (Okike, 2004). Nevertheless, the corporate governance legislation in 
Nigeria has been historically weak (Ahunwan, 2002; Okike, 2007; Adegbite, 2012; Adegbite, 
et. al. 2013). For example, the report on the observance on the standards and codes prepared 
by the World Bank reported that institutional failures regarding regulation, compliance, and 
enforcement of rules and standards contributed to poor corporate governance in Nigeria 
(ROSC, 2004). According to Nwuche (2012), despite the presence of multiplicity of codes 
designed to address corporate fraud and malpractices in Nigeria, corporate governance 
practices in the country are still poor.  
 
Indeed, the recent history of corporate governance regulation in Nigeria stemmed from the 
lessons learned from the corporate malpractices and near-collapse of the Nigerian banking 
industry in the 1990s. Also, the magnitude of the Enron scandal and the global attention on 
corporate governance led to the formation of the SEC code in 2003. It was the first code of 
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corporate governance in Nigeria and its introduction improved the corporate governance 
system (Okike, 2007). However, there were numerous issues and challenges surrounding the 
implementation and enforcement of the SEC code. In particular the SEC as a regulator, was 
not only slow in the implementation and enforcement of the code but lacked the foresight to 
offer an updated version of the code in time (Ofo, 2010; 2013).  Consequently, this led to the 
proliferation of codes with different industries developing their codes to regulate their 
stakeholders (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Mandatory and Voluntary codes 
Codes Year 
Established 
Mandatory/ 
Voluntary  
Application/ Sector 
SEC Code 2003; 2011 
(revised) 
Voluntary All listed companies on 
NSE 
CBN code 2006 Mandatory Banks 
SEC code for Shareholders 2007 Voluntary Shareholders’ practitioners 
and associations 
PENCOM Code 2008 Mandatory Licensed operators 
NAICOM Code 2009 Mandatory Insurance companies 
 
Another reason for the proliferation of codes is the deficiency of the 2003 SEC code in 
minimising insider trading and preventing poor disclosure practices (Ofo, 2010; Demaki, 
2011). For example, the CBN mandatory code (2006) for banks was formulated by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria and designed for regulating corporate governance practices in banks, 
following a banking reform programme in 2006 (Wilson, 2006). The CBN code was issued to 
address the above-mentioned deficiencies from the SEC code. Also, in 2008, the pension 
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sector witnessed tremendous reforms, attracting the participation of investors into the pension 
sector and its fund management. As a result, the PENCOM code was issued in 2008 to 
promote proper disclosure and transparency by all the operators. The aim was to encourage 
self-regulation and standardised practices among the operators. Also established in 2009 was 
the NAICOM code for the insurance industry formulated by the Nigeria Insurance 
Commission. This was made mandatory for all insurance and re-insurance companies (Ofo, 
2012). This was done to accelerate the pace of development of the insurance industry through 
enhancing disclosures, transparency, accountability and subsequently improving the needed 
growth of Nigeria’s financial sector.  
 
Furthermore, the continued failure of companies in general to satisfy shareholders led to 
increased agitation by shareholders’ groups and associations. This intensified shareholders 
activism in Nigeria. According to Amao and Amaeshi (2008: 120) shareholder activism in 
Nigeria ought to enable companies ‘to gain shareholders’ confidence, by demonstrating that 
their companies are being run and managed efficiently, and that they have a real role to play 
in the company’. However, following the emergence of several shareholder associations, 
corrupt collaboration of engagement between activist/bully shareholders and board/ managers 
soon evolved to undermine the prospects of genuine activism (Adegbite, et. al 2012). 
Accordingly, the SEC code for shareholders was formulated and issued in 2007 in order to 
address “observed negative practices of shareholders’ associations in the Nigerian capital 
market” (Adegbite, et. al. 2012: 399).  
 
Given these multiple codes, the regulatory conflict debate in Nigeria has become intensified 
due to the contradictions within them (Ofo, 2010; Nwokoji, 2011; Demaki, 2011; 
Ogbuozobe, 2009; Fadare, 2011; Nwokoji, 2012). We proceed to examine the conflicts 
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arising from these codes in an attempt to understand the impacts4 of corporate governance 
regulatory multiplicity. This paper presents a Nigerian perspective of an array of codes and 
the conflicts they present, including the attendant monitoring and enforcement implications 
and challenges arising from the conflicts. This is particularly important as the SEC code 
which is supposed to be superior to the mandatory industry-specific codes is considered as 
lenient and lax. Subsequently, the industry-specific codes take higher priority over the SEC 
code, creating a situation where the companies may argue they practice better corporate 
governance even when they are not complying with the SEC code. The foregoing highlights 
the confusing and complicated state of corporate governance regulation in Nigeria due to the 
multiplicity of codes. Hence our research inquiry is hinged upon the question: what are the 
nature, challenges and implications arising from regulatory conflicts on the effectiveness of 
corporate governance practices?  
 
Research Methodology and Analysis  
Research Approach 
This research adopts a mixed method approach, including the survey, interview, documentary 
analysis and focus group methods. This methodology offered an in-depth and detailed 
perspective on corporate governance practices in Nigeria (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006; Adegbite 
et. al., 2012). The methodological approach was aimed at reducing sample error (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005), while at the same time allowing the research to benefit from the strengths of 
all methods, and compensating for their individual methods. In particular, the survey 
                                                          
4For example, one of the disadvantages of the multiplicity of corporate governance codes in Nigeria relates to 
the resolution of conflicts between the SEC code and the three industry-specific codes (Ofo, 2013). These 
conflicts can be observed in terms of companies’ compliance and disclosure. For example, the 2011 SEC code 
appears unsure and uncertain in term of applicability (Adekoya, 2011). Also, the SEC code does not state 
categorically if it is superior over the three industry codes or not (Ofo, 2013) but only recommends that in 
circumstances of clash between the various codes, the code that is most stringent on the issues remains superior. 
This is however, confusing to companies and managers (Demaki, 2011; Ofo, 2013). 
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(quantitative) method provided generalisation and breadth, which allowed us to capture the 
compliance implications of multiple codes on governance practices in Nigerian PLCs. This 
also helped achieve data coverage and a high number of data respondents (Creswell, 2003). 
The survey method also allowed us to use findings from a representative sample to make 
predictions about a whole population,while the interview and focus group (qualitative) 
methods provided a deeper understanding of the subject of inquiry (Creswell, 2003; Saunders 
et. al., 2007). Furthermore, ethical issues and concerns were addressed and respondents were 
assured of utmost confidentiality.  
 
Data Collection 
The data collection was done in two phases: 1) the first phase involved the survey method 
and the use of interviews. Also, documents relating to the various codes were gathered and 
analysed.5 2) The second phase involved the use of the focus group technique. We present 
these next. 
 
Survey questionnaire 
The survey method helped us to achieve a wide spread coverage of data across Nigerian 
PLCs and improved the generalizability power of our findings on the antecedents and 
implications of corporate governance regulatory multiplicity in Nigeria.6 It further helped to 
avoid potential bias in data collection and interpretation common with interview method 
                                                          
5These documents are the SEC Code of Corporate Governance of 2003 and 2011, the CBN Code of Corporate 
Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation 2006, the SEC Code for Shareholders 2007, the Pension 
Commission of Nigeria’s Code of Corporate Governance for Licensed Pension Operators 2009 and the 
National Insurance Commission’s Code of good corporate governance for the Insurance Industry 2008. 
6 The spread in the surveys helped to cover geographically wide samples. This allowed participants (PLCs) who 
are widely dispersed to be accessed and included in the sample. In particular, Nigeria is made up of 36 states 
with these companies widely dispersed across the states. This necessitated the use of the survey method which 
enabled that all the states and companies were covered. 
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(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). The questionnaires7 were sent to all the listed companies (224) 
on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE)8 in 2010. In order to minimize social response bias 
and increase validity and reliability of instruments, the questionnaires were simple and 
directly worded. The tick box system was employed to increase the response rate (Saunders 
et. al., 2007). Invalid responses were discarded (See Appendix F for the breakdown of the 
survey questionnaires).9 In ensuring that the result from the sample survey was consistent 
with the population, so as to promote the generalizability power of the data, a large sample 
size of 224 PLCs was sent questionnaires and a good response rate10 of 45.5% of completed 
questionnaires was achieved (see Appendix A).  
 
Interview 
The need to minimise self-evaluation, self-selection as well as the need to have a deeper and 
robust understanding of the multiplicity of codes led to the use of the interview method. 
Thus, following the review of the survey questionnaires, eighteen (18) in-depth interviews 
                                                          
7Although the questionnaires were addressed to the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), accompanying telephone 
calls and email reminders were sent to companies emphasising that any top ranking manager could complete the 
questionnaires if the CEO was unavailable or unable to complete. As a result, the views represented in this paper 
are those of top management teams which are very critical and significant to understanding the regulatory 
multiplicity of codes and their implications. See the introductory letter to the questionnaire in Appendix A. 
8The NSE transactions are regulated by the NSE and the SEC which administers the Investment and Securities 
Act of 1999. All PLCs submit their audited annual financial statements to the NSE, which is a mandatory 
requirement by NSE and SEC. In other words, NSE collates historical information and extracts from balance 
sheets, profit and loss accounts, and financial ratios of PLCs. Similarly, the NSE’s fact book publishes both the 
management and financial information of PLCs such as directorship shareholdings, board of directors’ 
characteristics and financial statements. The company reports are prepared according to SAS 30 and IAS 34 
guidelines. The SAS 30 and IAS 34 are financial reporting standards and part of the SEC rule. This involves the 
publication of the quarterly annual report in one national daily newspaper as a sign of transparency to investors. 
The NSE transactions are published and documented in NSE Fact book annually. For more discussion on the 
Nigerian corporate governance system including the nature of its companies, capital markets and institutions, 
equity ownership structure, board composition and how they have evolved (see: Ahunwan 2002; Adegbite 2012; 
Adegbite, et al. 2012; Ahunwan, 2002; Okike, 2007; Yakasai, 2001; Amao and Amaeshi, 2008;  Tricker 1996). 
9The valid responses represent the completed questionnaires while the invalid responses are part of the discarded 
questionnaires. By this we mean responses that are free from mistakes and errors such as miss-spelling or 
incomplete statements. 
10They were 224 PLCs in 2010 and all were sent questionnaires. 102 completed questionnaires were returned 
and collected. A response rate of 45.5% (that is 102 as a percentage of 224) was thus achieved. These 
companies constituted the sampling frame which, according to Creswell (2003), explains the objective list of the 
population size. In order to ensure that the result from the sample survey was consistent with the population, and 
in an attempt to improve generalization, a large sample size and high response rate of completed questionnaire 
was aimed at. 
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were conducted in 201011. Appendix B presents the respondents’ details. We ensured the 
appropriateness of the interview questions and ascertained respondents’ understanding and 
correct interpretation (Adegbite, et. al. 2012). Data respondents included corporate 
governance stakeholders who are top management officials such as chairmen, Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs), directors, academics and managers who provided detailed 
information on the extent and impact of multiplicity of codes on the corporate governance 
practices in Nigeria. The average duration of interview sessions was 60 minutes. The 
interviews were subsequently transcribed and analysed. 
 
Documentary Analysis 
The archival documents relating to the various codes were gathered and analysed to identify 
the differences and point out areas of conflicts. These documents included the codes of 
corporate governance, newspaper reports and other regulatory documents. This was done to 
validate the comments of data respondents and to ensure that the statements reflected reality. 
 
Focus Group 
The second stage of the data collection exercise involved the use of a focus group session to 
complement and corroborate some of the information collected through the interviews 
survey, and documentary analysis, and to further facilitate discussions on the multiplicity of 
codes in Nigeria in a way that provided further insights into the inherent challenges of 
governance in the country. This focus group discussion took place in May 2013 (See 
Appendix H).12 The researchers conducted two separate focus group sessions; one had 7 
                                                          
11The criteria for selecting the interviewees were based on top managers who are accessible and who have and 
are willing to provide such relevant information. Out of the 52 interviewees selected only 18 interviewees 
accepted to grant interviews. 
12 Focus group participants were selected following initial conversations to ensure that they had sufficient 
knowledge on the topic of discussion and that they had enough interest to discuss the topic. This provided us 
with the opportunity to learn a little about each participant before talking to them in the focus group. It also 
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members and the other had 10 members totalling 17 respondents. The size of the group was 
kept small in order to enhance efficiency and to allow members to freely discuss the topics of 
interest without actual or perceived intimidation, shyness or pressures from other respondents 
(Creswell, 2003; Adegbite, et. al. 2012).13 Some respondents declined to participate, due to 
lack of time, lack of knowledge concerning the codes and inability to provide relevant 
information. Focus group data offered the opportunity to capture respondents’ interactions on 
the dynamics of corporate governance regulation in Nigeria. For example, during discussions, 
individuals differed, agreed and sometimes modified their opinion, thus generating data with 
more depth. The focus group sessions were able to capture the perceptions surrounding the 
behaviours, decision-making and practices of the managers in response to the multiplicity of 
codes. The focus group transcripts were subsequently analysed. 
 
Data Analysis 
The mixed-method research strategy was to allow for the collection of rich data that captures 
the dynamics of regulatory conflicts among the various codes (see Adegbite et. al. 2012). 
These methods complemented one another’s strengths and weaknesses. In particular, the 
survey data and the documentary analysis provided the opportunity to identify as well as 
understand the nature and impact of multiplicity and conflict within the regulatory codes.  
Also it helped to illustrate the extent of compliance by companies in various sectors. The 
interview and focus group methods provided the opportunity to explore the nature and causes 
of conflicts among codes and the associated implications.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
provides us with an opportunity to ensure that they understood the goals of the study and are knowledgeable 
about the codes and its implementations. This also provided the researcher and participants the opportunity to be 
comfortable with one another prior to focus group discussions.  
13A fair and balanced approach was adopted for the focus group to ensure diversity and fair representation of 
participants from different backgrounds and roles. This was to guarantee that the perceptions, opinions, beliefs, 
attitudes and comments of participants were from different perspectives. For details of respondents in focus 
groups, see Appendix C. A tape recorder was used to record the two sessions and each of them took an average 
of 80 minutes. The analysis of focus group data presents both challenges and opportunities when compared to 
interview and survey data, particularly it presented the opportunity to observe interactions and how discussions 
unfold among the various respondents. 
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As for the interview and focus group methods, the interpretation of data involved the constant 
iterative moving back and forth of data to form the theoretical concepts, involving the process 
of building constructs (Ritchie and Lewis, 2006). The first stage of the analysis thus involved 
starting with a small portion of the data, and formulating an initial set of categories of the 
evidence of conflicts in corporate governance regulation in Nigeria. This formed the basis for 
a comparison and validation with the questionnaire data, leading to the emerging 
narrative/theme of the current paper (Creswell, 2003).   
 
Findings and Discussions 
Although there are some areas of synergy and agreement, the findings of this study in the 
main reveal significant conflicts among the codes. In this section, we use the conflict-
signalling theory to articulate the implications of these conflicts on corporate governance 
practices and its attendant negative impacts such as non-compliance and laxity in 
enforcement.  
 
Conflict among Multiple Codes: Implications for Corporate Governance Practices and 
Compliances 
This study finds that issues relating to the multiplicity of codes include the lack of specificity 
(i.e. presence of ambiguities) in the code’s recommendations and the conflicts among them. 
These ambiguities are related to the recommendations on board size, directors’ independence, 
CEO duality, board membership and audit committees. Most survey respondents reported 
that there were widespread conflicts among the regulatory codes. The interview and focus 
group respondents also agree that these conflicts made non-compliance ubiquitous. 
Respondents express their concerns with regards to the capability of the regulatory agencies 
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to promote good corporate governance with the existing multiple codes. Our results suggest 
that conflicts in the codes are considered as irritations, time wasting and a sufficient rationale 
for non-compliance. We proceed to explore these in the previously mentioned specific 
corporate governance drivers. 
 
Board size 
From the documentary analysis, the board size remains an area of conflict among the codes. 
For instance, the SEC code recommends the board size to be between 5-15 directors, while 
the CBN code was not specific with the number of NEDs and executive directors in the 
board. The CBN code stipulates that NEDs should not exceed the executive directors in the 
board. An interview respondent Z4, who is a chairman in one of Nigeria’s banks, explained 
that: 
“section 4.2 of the SEC code states that the directors in the board should not be less than five 
(5) and not exceed fifteen (15) directors; this is at variance with the 2006 CBN code for 
Banks in section 5.3.5 that states ‘the number of NEDs should be more than that of executive 
directors subject to a maximum board size of 20 directors” 
 
 
In this case, the SEC code recommends a minimum of 5 directors and a maximum of 15 
directors without specifying if NEDs should be higher in number than the executive directors 
unlike the CBN code. An interview respondent (W3), who is a bank director, asserts on the 
same subject as follows:  
“This conflict among the codes creates uncertainty for companies during planning and 
decision making process. Companies need information to come from one source and not 
conflicting sources. Particularly, information that are not misleading or contradictory, else 
this affects not only the performance of the company but the independence of external 
directors because the board might appoint anyone who is their friend and blame the 
conflicting codes for their action (that is favouritism).” 
 
 
Thus, there is a growing dissatisfaction with regards to the conflict among the codes. A focus 
group respondent (B2) states: 
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“There are significant doubt about the agenda of the SEC, CBN, NAICOM, PENCOM and 
these so-called regulatory agencies. Most of us believed that these things constitute greed and 
the quest for power among the regulators. Each of them is seeking power and relevance, by 
disagreeing with themselves, leaving us to bear the cost. This is a common feature even in the 
polity where a winner wants to take all and constitute themselves as the overall power and 
control our life and businesses.” 
  
Rent seeking and self-indulgence was further highlighted by some survey respondents as an 
important driver for regulatory multiplicity. Furthermore, data respondents suggest that there 
is a growing perception that the industry specific codes are more effective than the SEC code 
because of their mandatory provisions (see Ofo, 2010; 2013). Some respondents also argued 
that developing countries such as Nigeria should have their own code tailored along their 
values and institutional context if they are to avoid conflicts arising from codes. According to 
a focus group participant (C4), who attributed conflicts in the codes to the copying of 
standards from other countries, 
“The SEC code follows a western logic. Must we follow the UK combined code or the 
OECD standards in designing our code? This is where the conflicts come from. For example, 
the CBN code is copied from the US while the SEC code is UK. Is it possible for Nigeria and 
Africa to develop their regulatory standard that suits our culture of togetherness and 
inclusiveness and suit our environment and society? These codes copied from developed 
countries such as the UK, US and Europe are always not aligned with our values and culture. 
Our people should not be subjected to copying or else they should expect conflicts and 
confusion during implementation and practices. This is why we as managers are confused as 
what to do. Most times we just ignore the codes but for record purposes we just tick the boxes 
as a signal for compliance to the codes and for auditing purposes. This gives the regulators 
the impression that we are compliant to the codes and this is what they need and we just do it 
to avoid pressures from them” 
 
Another interviewee’s respondent (W3) notes as follows:  
“Companies comply even when they know that the codes conflict with one another because 
they want to boost their ego, brand name, image and reputation as if they are practicing good 
governance. In avoiding pressures from regulators, the companies mislead the regulators 
since they are just paying lip-service to the code recommendations” 
 
The survey results (see Table 2) further confirms the comments above, indicating conflicts 
among the various codes. Majority of the respondents across the main business sectors in 
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Nigeria responded ‘yes’ to the presence of conflicts among the various codes, as also 
mentioned severally by the interview participants. Overall 67% of respondents agreed that 
discrepancies exist among the codes and this is a matter of huge concern to stakeholders. 
Table 2 further suggests that the conflicts are common to all the sectors, particularly the 
banking sector, despite the fact that it is the sector that is most-regulated (Yakassi, 2001). 
 
Table 2: Conflict of the various codes 
Companies Yes No 
Did not 
Specify Total 
Commercial Banks 21 5 0 26 
Insurance 10 6 0 16 
Service 9 1 4 14 
Manufacturing 11 7 3 21 
Hotel 10 4 1 15 
Oil and Gas 8 2 0 10 
Overall 69 25 8 102 
 
 
Board Independence 
The SEC code (2011) recommends that the board should have at least one independent NED. 
Similarly the PENCOM and NAICOM codes stipulate at least one independent director on 
the board. In contrast, the CBN code recommends at least two independent directors. In terms 
of interlocking directorships, the SEC code proposes no limit to the number of boards that 
directors can serve on at any one time. However, the CBN code disapproves of this practice. 
In particular, section 6.1 of the SEC code (2011) stated that there should be no limit on the 
number of concurrent directorships that a director of a company may hold, although the SEC 
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code indicates in subsection ‘d’ that directors should not be members of boards of companies 
in the same industry. All in all, the CBN code disapproves of this because it leads to conflict 
of interests and is capable of interfering with an individual’s ability to discharge his/her 
responsibilities.  
 
Moreover, the documentary analysis of the codes revealed that whilst the SEC code (2003) 
and the CBN code (2006) stipulate that NEDs should be independent directors, the NAICOM 
code states that the board should ensure the independence of the organisation irrespective of 
its relationship with other companies or group. This is conflicting given that the presence of 
NEDs determines how independent the board is (Dalton and Daily, 2004). NEDs ensure that 
the board delivers its oversight function independently without pressure from management. 
They are able to do this because they have no stakes in the companies and this enables them 
to act in the company’s best interest (Ofo, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, in order to guarantee board independence, the NAICOM code recommends that 
an independent director must be appointed at the company’s Annual General Meeting 
(AGM).  The  individual director must  not  have  any  share,  nor any direct  or indirect 
pecuniary interest in the organisation such that he/she can dispassionately evaluate the  
performance  of  the  board  and  management,  and mediate  where  interests of management,  
the  company  and  its  shareholders  diverge  (Ehikioya, 2007; Egwuatu, 2010; Ofo, 2012; 
2013).  In  addition  to  the  position  of  the independent director,  the  code  also  provides  
for  the  position  of  a  minority  shareholder  on  the board  in  an  effort  to  protect  
minority  shareholder groups (Babington-Ashaye, 2011). In the case of the PENCOM code, it 
is the board that specifies and documents the procedures and criteria for appointing a new 
director, while the regulatory commission is responsible for determining, annually, whether 
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or not the independent director is truly independent. This differs from the NAICOM code that 
has the directors’ appointment done at the AGM.  
CEO Duality 
The respondents’ views were mixed on CEO duality. Some respondents noted that CEO 
duality is common, while others disagree. In section 5.1(b) of the SEC code (2011), it 
provides that ‘the positions of the Chairman of the Board and CEO shall be separate and held 
by different individuals’. To ensure further clarity in the position, section 5.1(a) provides that 
the Chairman should not be involved in the day-to-day operations of the company but be 
responsible for effective operations of the board. The separation of the two positions is to 
ensure good corporate governance practices (Monks and Minows, 2008; Mallin, 2004). 
According to an interview respondent (Z3): 
“Banks have witnessed great transformation since the CBN code was enacted, especially with 
regards to making sure that family members and favouritism displayed in the board are 
reduced. Also the level of CEO duality has decreased tremendously. However, in certain 
cases where there is overwhelming evidence of good performance of the company, CEO 
duality does exist in situation where the CEO or chairman in question has performed 
extremely well and the Bank might want the person to continue to occupy both posts. In this 
case the bank violates the codes’ recommendations for CEO duality as mentioned above.” 
 
 
The above comment was supported by the survey results as shown in Table 3. Despite the 
regulatory conflicts in relation to family member representatives on boards, the findings 
indicate a high compliance (75%) with the recommendations that separate persons should 
occupy the posts of the CEO and chairman. However some respondents disagree with the 
above assertion that CEO duality is not common. According to one of the interview 
respondents, W4,  
“The CEO duality in Nigeria and other developing countries such as Ghana are a hoax. In 
practice, most companies don’t follow the rules of separation of the two posts particularly 
when the company is performing very well. The CEO can be allowed to remain as the 
chairperson” 
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Also, a focus group respondent C3 agrees by stating that: 
“CEO duality and power grabbing by CEOs are caused by not only the weak laws and 
regulatory multiplicity but also the resulting weak enforcement by government officials”. 
  
Some respondents noted that the split of the chairman and the CEO’s roles is to ensure that a 
system of checks and balances exists in the running of the affairs of the company. Other 
respondents argued that a high performing CEO can occupy both positions if necessary. 
 
Board Membership: Participation by Family Members and Tenureship 
The CBN code proposes that no two members of the same family shall occupy the post of the 
chairman and CEO at the same time, but the SEC code (2011) allows two persons of the same 
family.  According to a director in one of the largest banks in Nigeria (Z3): 
“Some banks still flout these directives about family members occupying these positions in 
the board because the rules conflict’. What do you except when one rule say something and 
another rule say something different regarding a given directive or policy. This is appalling” 
 
The provisions of the SEC and CBN codes are conflicting, thereby sending different signals 
to the boards and managements of PLCs. In addition, when it comes to the tenure of the 
Table 3: Is chair also CEO 
Companies Yes No Did not Specify Total 
Commercial Banks 1 22 0 24 
Insurance 0 12 4 22 
Service 4 8 3 20 
Manufacturing 1 4 1 12 
Hotel 0   5 
Oil and Gas 1 8 0 9 
Overall 7 77 8 102 
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CEOs, the SEC code is silent on the tenure of CEOs, while the CBN code stipulates ten years. 
On the tenure of CEOs, an interviewee respondent Z3, who is a director in a large Nigerian 
firm, responded that: 
“The CBN’s tenure for CEO was so long initially as these affected and encouraged sit-tight 
CEOs who do not want to retire. Thanks to the apex bank that put a stop to this madness by 
making these CEOs to take their leave after 10 year tenure and they have since found their 
destiny in other fields of human endeavours?” 
 
A focus group respondent, A3, who is the director of a government regulatory agency, also 
noted that: 
“The initial tenureship of a CEO was unlimited and this has been bad for governance. Though 
the CBN has reduced theirs to 10 years, there is need for SEC to adopt this measure for other 
industrial sectors, since unlimited tenureship is not only common with banks alone, but 
occurs in other sectors and also leads to managerial corruption” 
 
In sum, the general consensus in practice is that unlimited tenureship is unhealthy for good 
governance. Hence most respondents recommended that the SEC code should adopt the 10 
year CEO tenureship as a policy for all PLCs and not only for thebanks. 
 
Audit Committee 
There is also conflict in the codes regarding the person who oversees the function of the 
internal and external auditors. The CBN code limits the independence role to that of the audit 
committee which shall, in addition to overseeing the bank’s internal audit function, be 
involved in monitoring the activities of the external auditors. Similarly, the NAICOM code 
provides that the audit committee recommends the appointment of external auditors to the 
board and they shall be accountable to the board. Making external auditors accountable to the 
board reduces the degree of accountability required for effective corporate governance. In 
contrast, the SEC code recommends an independent reviewer team different from the audit 
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committee and external auditor to handle these functions. In this case, the external reviewer 
team shall monitor the activities and performance of both the internal and external auditors.  
The SEC and CBN codes also disagree on the reappointments of external auditors. Whilst the 
SEC code stipulates that reappointment may occur seven years after their contract expires; 
the CBN code recommends reappointment after a period of ten years. Furthermore, the SEC 
code (2003) stipulates that the chairman of the audit committee should be a board member, 
which is in line with PENCOM and NAICOM codes’ recommendation, but the SEC code 
2011 remains silent on who should be the chairman. In contrast, the CBN code recommends 
that the chairman should be a shareholders’ representative. As the audit committee is a 
creation of the law (CAMA, 1990) and not the board, the presence of shareholders on the 
board committees may undermine the confidentiality of board meetings. Also, conflicts may 
arise from the fact that some companies have a board audit committee different from the 
CAMA audit committee.  
 
The foregoing suggests that the independence of auditors is crucial to corporate governance 
regulation because if it is compromised, companies can capitalize on it to give misleading 
financial reports to the public. The conflict-signalling theory thus helps to conceptualise the 
conflicts and the mixed signals they communicate to stakeholders particularly managers who 
might choose which code to comply with or ignore during disclosures.  
 
Towards a Mandatory Combined Code of Corporate Governance 
Despite the arguments in support of the multiplicity of codes as a corporate governance 
regulatory device aimed at meeting the needs of various stakeholders, the supporting 
empirical evidences are lacking in developing countries (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). The 
findings support conflict-signalling theory as an explanation for non-compliance arising from 
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the multiplicity of codes and its resulting conflicts. With evidences from a developing 
country - Nigeria, we find that conflict in the multiplicity of codes provides a platform where 
causal responsibility is avoided, shifted, or masked in the practice of corporate governance. 
 
In this case, the multiplicity of codes hinders the rapid institutionalisation of the values of 
good corporate governance as demanded by the codes. Although the enforcement of the 
various codes was designed to be industry specific and stakeholder focused (Selznick, 1957; 
Monks and Minows, 2004; 2008), their implementation continues to falter as the conflicts 
among them aided the confusion and conflict generated among the codes. Therefore, given 
the weak state of corporate governance in sub-Saharan Africa, there is the need for 
mandatory compliance with a single combined code. This can lead to the resolution of the 
conflicts arising from the multiplicity of codes. The CEO of a large Nigerian Bank (W3) 
notes as follows: 
“There is need for mandatory compliance with a single code following the sorts of weak and 
ineffective institutions that we have in the country.” 
 
Another respondent (E2), a director of a major oil company, states that: 
“The idea of having conflicting directives from the different codes is damaging...Compliance 
should be mandatory and all the codes should be combined. We need one code not five as we 
have presently. I say presently because we may even have more, if we do not learn” 
 
The findings of this research suggest that another factor hindering good governance is the 
lack of enforceability from the regulatory agencies, particularly the SEC. 51% of respondents 
agree that there is ineffective enforcement (See Appendix G). This is consistent with the SEC 
findings that 60% of PLCs do not comply with corporate governance regulation (NSE 
Factbook, 2009).  The situation is worsened due to conflict within regulatory provisions 
which suggests the need for a single code of conduct that requires mandatory compliance. In 
particular, the SEC code may lack stakeholders’ confidence for its inability to enforce 
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compliance which may encourage industry regulators to rely on their own peculiar codes. 
This criticism is anchored on the limited enforcement by the SEC. Supporting mandatory 
compliance is also respondent Z2’s preference who notes thus:  
“The Nigeria regulatory framework and policies guiding governance of firms should be 
compulsory because we are still a developing nation and as such needs iron hand if our 
companies are to survive and grow in the long term”. 
 
 
Currently, managers exploit the conflict in the codes for their self-interest, for instance using 
the conflict to justify some of their decisions of favouring (complying with) certain aspect of 
the codes over others. For example, a respondent, Z4, the CEO of one of Nigerian banks, 
when asked if companies take advantage of the conflict among codes during disclosure 
answered thus:  
“Definitely yes, they always do. Banks will say they are complying with the CBN code and 
ignore the SEC code because the CBN code is compulsory and mandatory while the SEC 
code is voluntary. So they feel obliged to comply with the CBN code and at the same time 
use it as a cover to avoid some unfavourable recommendations from the SEC code” 
 
The conflict-signal theory helps to articulate these conflicts and their attendant compliance 
implications for listed companies through the mixed signals they send to stakeholders. We 
note that whilst the problem of non-compliance is part of a wider problem of lax regulation, 
weak institutional framework, and corruption in corporate Nigeria, the regulatory multiplicity 
and associated conflict further undermines regulatory enforcement, indicating incoherence in 
notions of how to regulate corporate governance and promote good behaviour. As the 
Nigerian President has recently signed into law the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria14 
                                                          
14The FRCN Act established the FRCN and was formerly known as the Nigerian Accounting Standards Board 
(NASB) which was established in 1982 as a private sector initiative under the aegis of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN). The FRCN Act 2011 created the stable regulatory environment in the corporate 
sector. This FRCN was covered by the statutory regulatory legislation and also vested with power and 
responsibility of ensuring companies maintains good corporate governance practices (Ofo, 2012; Ofo, 2013). 
However, it is noteworthy to mention that the FRCN is still at the early stages of formation (Obazee, 2013). 
According to Okobi (2013) Nigeria is moving in the right direction with the FRCN Act and the IFRS adoption. 
Currently, the FRC is also expected to harmonise the various codes into a single code of corporate governance 
in Nigeria. 
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(FRCN) Act, we expect that the Financial Reporting Council will put together a framework to 
unify the existing codes into a single applicable code for the corporate sector.   
 
Further Discussions 
In this paper, we have presented some evidence regarding the implications of corporate 
governance regulatory conflict as it concerns practitioners, managers and companies’ 
disclosure and compliance practices, drawing insights from a less reported research site 
Nigeria. Most research in finance and management focuses on proliferation of multiple codes 
internationally (Aguilera et. al., 2008; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Zattoni and Cuomo, 
2008) with only a few studies focused on the proliferation of codes within individual country 
settings (Demaki, 2011; Ofo, 2010, 2013). This study compliments existing works by 
showing that in the presence of multiplicity of codes, companies can signal both effective and 
ineffective corporate governance through selective compliance to the codes of best practices. 
In particular, our study suggests that errant companies’ benefit from conflicts arising from the 
multiplicity of codes by linking such selective compliance to good communication, 
transparency and accountability, which helps to enhance their image and reputation. 
 
Furthermore, since codes generally contain many best practice provisions, it is possible to 
comply with one provision, and not comply with another, especially where identifying a 
normative practice is cumbersome due to multiplicity of standards. This is even more 
complex where compliance by companies with one of the codes automatically means a 
violation of another code. Instances of these have been highlighted in prior discussions. This 
has impacted negatively on the level of compliances and enforcements of the various codes 
(Demaki, 2011). The conflicts among codes further create loopholes that can be exploited by 
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self-serving managers at the expense of shareholders, thereby encouraging managerial 
opportunism and agency conflict (Kaptein, 2011; Kirkbride and Letza, 2004), and raising 
agency costs that affects performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993).  
 
As a result, given the several challenges surrounding the implementation of corporate 
governance regulations in the country, in particular, the weakness of institutional agencies, 
political interferences by government officials, poor institutional investors’ activism, and 
weak legal protection for investors’ rights, the usefulness of a single mandatory code cannot 
be over emphasized. 
 
 
Implications/Contributions of Study  
Theory  
Our paper contributes to corporate governance theory by advancing the conflict-signalling 
theory for understanding the antecedents and impact of multiplicity of regulatory codes. We 
specifically combined the conflict and signalling theoretical approaches to develop a 
conceptual framework for assessing the corporate governance practices of companies and 
attitudes of managers towards multiple regulatory codes. As a result, we have been able to 
extend the conflict-signalling theory to the literature on multiplicity of codes, in explaining 
the complexities and implications of the conflict of the code regimes. A conflict-signalling 
theoretical framing helped to show that signals can be important in helping companies avoid 
compliance with corporate governance standards but in a way which prevents a consequential 
reputational damage. This is the situation in our Nigerian case study. 
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Our findings also support the assumptions of the agency theory15  concerning self-interest of 
managers. For instance, the conflict-signalling theory perspectives argue that the presence of 
conflict exacerbates the agency conflict (Hendrick, 2007; Haskovec, 2012). Therefore, the 
conflict-signalling theory assumes multiple codes generate conflicts among managers, 
companies and regulators, where managers use these conflicts as justifications to avoid 
compliance with one code by complying with another code. In this case they are able to 
conceal their corporate governance weaknesses. As the conflict-signalling theory assumes, 
the behaviour of top managers and their decision making processes are influenced by the 
conflicts within competing codes, thereby creating an environment for opportunism among 
managers. The theoretical basis of our discussions – conflict-signalling theory – enabled us to 
highlight blame, selective-compliance, self-exoneration (Ghosh and Srinidhi, 2010), 
opportunism, weak enforcement, and overall poor corporate governance in the weak 
institutional context of Nigeria.    
 
Practice 
Our analysis unveiled the presence of multiplicity of codes and conflicts therein, both in 
understanding of the provisions and in shaping governance practices. Whilst different 
stakeholders’ needs may be met by multiple codes, it contributes to significant conflict in 
compliance, and its attendant opportunistic behaviour by managers, particularly in developing 
economies. The regulatory system of different countries should thus be developed taking into 
considerations their peculiar circumstances and challenges.  Demaki (2011) maintains that the 
proliferation of codes in Nigeria has impacted negatively on economic development, as the 
deficiencies in the codes could be exploited by companies during disclosures. Moghalu 
                                                          
15The agency theory argues against this conflict also by stipulating that the interest of managers should be 
separated from self and aligned to that of owners (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen; 
1993).   
. 
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(2011) also asserts that the absence of a mandatory compliance in the SEC code has 
implications for the financial system as a whole not only in Nigeria but also in the developing 
economies of the world.  
 
Consequently, in improving corporate governance in Nigeria, a unified code is important as 
well as the strengthening of the institutional enforcement mechanisms. The various 
government institutions responsible for ensuring good governance practices in Nigeria should 
be empowered to punish offenders or violators of the unified code’s recommendations. This 
will make enforcement more effective, as compliance or non-compliance becomes more 
easily detectable, thus discouraging non-compliance. Indeed, since there is an interface 
between the code and the law and for the code to have the effect of law, it must create penalty 
for offenders of the provisions.  
 
Conclusion 
We conclude that multiple codes of corporate governance are ineffective in regulating the 
corporate sector, particularly in developing countries. This research study advances our 
understanding of how multiple codes are conflicting and how the affected companies address 
the issue of conflicts among codes. We explored this from a conflict-signalling theoretical 
perspective and noted that conflicts of codes are further influenced by the sociological and 
institutional environment in which managers and business organisations are embedded. This 
paper points out the implication of the regulatory conflicts and how to harmonize the codes in 
order to promote and sustain good governance practices in Nigeria. Hence, the paper argues 
for a mandatory combined code of corporate governance for Nigeria and the strengthening of 
the institutional enforcement mechanism. Apart from addressing the conflict arising from the 
implementations of the various codes, establishing a mandatory and a combined code in the 
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Nigerian corporate system will enhance the quality of reporting, accountability and 
transparency by listed companies. The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria should take 
note.  
 
Our study contributes to the debate on corporate governance regulation and forges ahead a 
discourse on regulatory conflict, with empirical insights from a relatively under-researched 
context. The paper also contributes to the literature on corporate governance regulation in 
sub–Saharan Africa and how it relates to the conflict in the international corporate 
governance environment where the recommendations of OECD, World Bank and IMF may 
further lead to more conflicts, thus over-burdening companies and affecting their compliances 
(Adegbite, et. al. 2013). Our study further presents implications for understanding corporate 
governance regulatory challenges in developing markets and provides insights into how to 
structure the corporate governance regulation of listed and non-listed firms. In exploring and 
expounding on the conflict-signalling theory, we provide insights into the extent to which 
companies are prepared to anticipate and match stakeholder expectations in the absence of 
mandatory guidance on corporate governance matters and raise the issues of transparency, 
accountability and opportunism in reporting.  
 
The data employed for this paper is however limited to listed companies on the NSE and the 
study only covers certain industrial sectors within a single country but do not cover country 
to country differences or factors. Also, there is the possibility of respondents’ subjectivity and 
bias during our data collection. To reduce this possibility, we ensured that top management 
employees were approached for data collection purposes (See Appendix C, D and E for the 
lists of respondents). This helped to control for the likelihood of the position bias and 
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respondents were able to adequately engage with the research theme (Payne and Mansfield 
1973). 
  
Nevertheless, future research on corporate governance regulatory multiplicity could aim to 
use other instruments of data collection. For instance the use of observations can act as an 
alternative. Furthermore, regression analysis could help to determine the cause and effect 
relationships between multiplicity of codes, conflicts and corporate governance practices. 
Methods such as balanced panel data and fixed or random effect estimators can be employed 
as this resolves the problem of unobservable heterogeneity across firms, by removing the 
time-invariant variable, thereby resolving the problem of omitted variable bias and increasing 
the validity and reliability of research studies (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2003).   
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
 
Appendix A. Cover Letter and Survey Questionnaire 
 
Greenwich Maritime Campus    Email: ol17@gre.ac.uk  
Park Row, London      Date: 11/06/2010 
SE10 9LS        
Tel: +44(0)2083318205 
Fax: +44(0)2083319924  
 
Chief Executive Officer, 
....................................... 
....................................... 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Corporate Governance Codes in Nigeria. 
I am a PhD student in the Business School of the University of Greenwich. I am carrying out 
a research study on the conflict arising from the various corporate governance codes in 
Nigeria. There is multiplicity of corporate governance codes in Nigeria. These are the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Code of Corporate Governance developed in 
2003 later revised in 2011 (the SEC Code), the 2006 Code of Corporate Governance for 
Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation (CBN Code), the 2007 SEC Code of Conduct for 
Shareholders’ Associations (SEC Code for Shareholders), the 2008 Pension Commission of 
Nigeria’s Code of Corporate Governance for Licensed Pension Operators (PENCOM Code), 
and the 2009 National Insurance Commission’s Code of Good Corporate Governance for the 
Insurance industry (NAICOM Code).  
I would appreciate it if you could make out time to respond and fill out the questionnaire. The 
information will be used for research purposes only. I would be most grateful to receive any 
additional comments. Please do not hesitate to contact me on the above contact details if you 
have any questions. The researcher hereby assures all respondent of my willingness to 
maintain their privacy and adhere to strict confidentiality throughout the duration of this 
research. 
Please find enclosed a self-addressed envelope that can be used to return the completed 
questionnaire. 
Thanks for your understanding and cooperation. 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
Please complete the questions below by ticking the appropriate box. 
 
Section A 
 
A) Dimensions of Corporate Governance structure. 
 
1) What is the name of your company? 
 
2) Categorize your company in terms of size? 
a) Large  b) Medium  c) small  
d) Others..........................................................   
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3) Does your company have internal auditors?  YES….             NO….. 
 
4) Does your company have external auditors? YES….    NO….. 
 
5) How many committees do your company have? YES….                     NO….. 
 
6) What are the names of the board committees?  
7) Who is in charge of your board? YES             NO 
        a) CEOs   b) Board  c) Managers  d) Government 
d) Others...........................................................  
8) Which of the following CEOs/chairman position do your company have? 
a) Single person occupying CEO and chairman 
post....................................................................... 
b) Different persons occupying the positions of CEO and 
chairman................................................................  
c) None………………………………………….....…… 
9)  Do you think when managers are given incentives like share option and bonus they 
perform better?  
YES………..                 NO………… 
 
SECTION B 
B) Board of Directors Variable  
 
10) How many directors does your company have in the board? .................................... 
11) How of many of these directors are inside directors in the board?   
12) a) One   b) Two   c) Three   
d) Others..................................... 
13)  How of many of these directors are outside directors in the board? a) One   b) 
Two   c) Three  d) Others................................. 
 
14) What is the level of compliance of your company to the codes? 
Extremely High…….    High ………   Average….…    
Low………….                 Extremely Low.................... 
15) What is the number of women in the board?   a) One…  b) Two….  
 c) Three……  d) others................................. 
 
16) Does your company comply with more than one codes and why? Name the 
codes……….. Explain............................................. 
17) If yes to question 16 above, Do the codes conflict and how?  YES   NO     
Explain........................................... 
18) What is the level of enforcement?  
Extremely High…….    High ………   Average….…    
Low………….                 Extremely Low.................... 
 
SECTION C 
 
C) General Information on your company 
 
19) How do you describe the ownership structure and control of your company? 
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i.The largest shareholders has substantial voting right (for example above 35%) effectively 
control the company………………………………… 
ii.Two or more shareholders control the company………………… 
iii.Ownership is diffuse with no controlling 
shareholder………………………………………………………..                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
iv.Headquarter of Family owned business group of 
companies…………………………………………………………. 
v.Others……………………......................................................... 
 
20) What is nature of your business company? 
a) Parents company without branch………….…………………………………….. 
b) Parents company with branches nationwide……………………………………. 
c) Headquarter of Family owned business group of companies…………………… 
d) Branch of a family owned company…………………………………………….. 
e) Others……………………................................................................................ 
21) What is the relationship between the founder and the Managing Director? 
a) Employee Manager……………………………………………………………….. 
b)  He is founder of the company…………………………………………………. 
c) Founder’s relatives…………………………………………………………….. 
d) Others……………………….......................................................................... 
22) The CEOs of your company is of which origin? 
a) Nigerian-born CEO…………………………………………………. 
b) Expatriate/Foreign CEO…………………………………………….. 
c) African-born CEO…………………………………………………… 
d) Asian-born CEO……………………………………………………… 
e) Others…………………….................................................................... 
23) What is your age category? 
a) Less than 35 years…………. 
b) Between 35-45 year……….. 
c) 45-55 years………………… 
d) 55-65 years……………… 
e) Over 65 years………………. 
 
24) What is your educational qualification? 
a) Diploma level…………………………………………………. 
b) HND holder…………………………………………………… 
c) HND holder plus professional certificate……………………… 
d) Degree holder………………………………………………… 
e) Degree plus professional certificates………………………….. 
Others……………………...................................................... 
25) How long have worked for the company? 
a) Less than a year………………. 
b) 1-3 years……………………… 
c) 4-10 years…………………….. 
d) More than 10 years………….. 
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Appendix B: Coding of Interviewees Response 
 
The coding of interviewees from the four (4) PLCs was done to protect the identity of those 
interviewed as agreed prior to commencement of the exercise as shown in the covering letter 
sent to them. The codes assigned to the interviewees are related to the names of the 
companies, the Industrial and General Insurance (IGI) Company are assigned the prefix ‘IG’, 
‘E’ for ExxonMobil, ‘W’ for Wema Bank and ‘Z’ for Zenith Bank. 
 
Summaries of Field Interviews 
Interviews Industrial 
General 
Insurance 
PLC 
ExxonMobil Wema 
Bank PLC 
Zenith Bank 
PLC 
Number of 
interviews 
5 4 4 5 
Code of 
interviewees 
IG1, IG2, IG3, 
IG4 and IG5  
E1, E2, E3 and 
E4 
W1, W2, W3 
and W4 
Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4 
and Z5 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix C: Focus group 
General information of respondent background/function of Number of experts 
Scholars 
Finance 
Management consultants 
2 
2 
2 
Government regulators (civil servants) 2 
CEOs 
Deputy CEO 
Directors 
1 
2 
3 
Managers 3 
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Appendix D:   Profiles of respondents in survey and their relationship with interviewees 
Gender composition  Survey respondents 
 
 
    Interviewees 
 
 
 Male (%) Female (%) Male Female 
CEOs 80 20 
 
3 
 
0 
Deputy CEOs 90 10 
 
2 0 
Chairmen 50 50 1 1 
Public Relation Manager 60 40 1 0 
Operations Manager 80 20 1 0 
Finance Managers 70 30 1 0 
Consultants 80 20 1 0 
Director of Operations 70 30 0 1 
Administrative Manager 55 45 1 0 
Communication Manager 54 46 1 0 
Secretaries 45 55 1 0 
Investment 
Managers/analysts 
80 20 3 0 
Total   18 100 
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Appendix F: The Breakdown of Survey questionnaires 
Number of Plcs 224 
Completed questionnaires  102 
Incomplete questionnaires  122 
Invalid responses (discarded) 64 
Total  224 
 
Appendix G: Lack of Enforcement  
Sectors Yes No 
Did not 
Specify Total 
Commercial Banks 5 15 2 22 
Insurance 12 4 2 18 
Service 9 6 4 19 
Manufacturing 7 7 3 17 
Hotel 10 4 1 15 
Oil and Gas 8 2 1 11 
Overall 51 38 13 102 
 
There was a very high degree of agreement amongst respondents’ comments. The total 
number of respondents for the interviews and focus group discussions is 35. In terms of the 
professional/disciplinary backgrounds of the experts, a reasonable spread was reached.  
 
Appendix E: Profiles of respondents in survey and their relationship with 
interviewees continues 
 Survey Interviewees 
 Number of 
Respondents 
Nigerians 
(66%) 
Non-
Nigerians 
(34%) 
Nigerians Non-
Nigerians 
CEOs 16 7 9 2 1 
Deputy CEOs 7 5 2 2 0 
Chairmen 6 6 0 3 0 
Public Relation 
Manager 
21 21 0 1 0 
Operations 
Manager 
7 6 1 0 0 
Finance Managers 5 3 2 1 0 
Consultants  12 12 0 1 0 
Director of 
Operations 
3 2 1 1 0 
Administrative 
Manager 
4 4 0 1 0 
Communication 
Manager 
8 8 0 1 0 
Secretaries 7 7 0 1 0 
Investment 
Managers/analysts 
6 5 1 2 1 
Total 102 86 16 16 2 
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APPENDIX H:  Focus Group Guide for Questions 
1 What are the corporate governance codes? 
2 How do the codes conflict and in what areas? 
3 What are the benefits and shortcomings of multiple codes? 
4 Do you think it’s fair to say that the codes conflict because of managers’ intention to 
avoid compliance or enforcement? What do you think the regulators should do? 
 
5 What are the ways forward? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I: 
Gender composition  Focus Group Participants 
 Male Female 
CEOs 1 
 
0 
Deputy CEOs 2 0 
Chairmen 1 1 
Public Relation Manager 0 1 
Operations Manager 1 0 
Finance Managers 1 0 
Consultants 1 0 
Director of Operations 0 1 
Administrative Manager 1 0 
Communication Manager 1 0 
Secretaries 1 1 
Investment 
Managers/analysts 
2 1 
Total 12 5 
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APPENDIX J: Profiles of Participants in Focus Group 
 
 Nigerians Non-
Nigerians 
CEOs 1 
 
0 
Deputy CEOs 1 1 
Chairmen 2 0 
Public Relation Manager 1 0 
Operations Manager 1 0 
Finance Managers 1 0 
Consultants 1 0 
Director of Operations 1 0 
Administrative Manager 1 0 
Communication Manager 1 0 
Secretaries 2 0 
Investment 
Managers/analysts 
2 1 
Total 15 2 
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APPENDIX K: ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AGM Annual General Meeting 
BOD Board of Directors 
CAC Corporate Affairs Commission 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CBN Central Bank of Nigeria 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
FRCN  Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria 
MNC Multinational Company 
NAICOM National Insurance Commission 
NED Non-Executive Director 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
NSE Nigerian Stock Exchange  
PAT Profit after Tax 
P/E Price Per Earnings 
PENCOM Pension National Commission 
E/S Earnings Per Share 
PLC Public Liability Company  
PRO Public Relation Officer 
R&D Research and Development 
ROA Return on Asset 
ROE Return on Equity 
ROS Return on Sales 
SEC Security and Exchange Commission 
SIC Standard Industrial Classification 
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States of America 
 
 
